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Abstract
Policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats.
This paper investigates the criteria that should lead a society to
allocate policy tasks to elected policymakers (politicians) or non
elected bureaucrats. Politicians tend to be preferable for tasks
that have the following features: they do not involve too much
speciﬁc technical ability relative to eﬀort; there is uncertainty
ex ante about ex post preferences of the public and ﬂexibility is
valuable; time inconsistency is not an issue; small but powerful
vested interests do not have large stakes in the policy outcome;
eﬀective decisions over policies require taking into account pol-
icy complementarities and compensating the losers; the policies
imply redistributive conﬂicts among large groups of voters. The
reverse apply to the attribution of prerogatives to bureaucrats.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Policies are chosen and implemented by both elected representatives
(politicians) and non elected bureaucrats. This paper studies the cri-
teria that should guide the allocation of policy responsibilities between
politicians and bureaucrats.
In most countries non elected central bankers conduct monetary pol-
icy, with much independence. Fiscal policy is, instead, by and large
chosen by elected representatives (governments and legislatures). Regu-
latory policies are normally the result of both political and bureaucratic
∗For useful comments we thank participants at the CIAR meeting in Toronto,
March 2003. This project was initiated while Alesina was visiting IGIER at Bocconi
university; he is very grateful for the hospitality.
1intervention. Foreign policy is decided by politicians. What criteria
should lead a society to allocate decision power on diﬀerent policy tasks?
Economists have emphasized one speciﬁc argument for delegating
policy to a non elected bureaucrat: time inconsistency in monetary pol-
icy, as in Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983).
Rogoﬀ (1985) pointed pout how an independent and inﬂation averse
central banker not subject to ex post democratic control would improve
social welfare. Walsh (1995) and Persson and Tabellini (1993) discussed
”contractual” arrangements between popular representatives and inde-
pendent central bankers.1
Time inconsistency is clearly not the only criterion for choosing be-
tween bureaucrats and politicians. There is much more to it. For in-
stance, even ﬁscal policy is marred with a host of time inconsistency
problems, but societies are reluctant to allocate this policy prerogative
to independent bureaucrats. Note, however, that Blinder (1997) argues
that some aspects of ﬁscal policy could be allocated to an independent
agency operating like an independent Central Bank.2 An ability to com-
mit to a certain course of action may even be desirable in foreign policy,
which however is always the prerogative of appointed politicians, at least
i nt h em o r er e l e v a n tp h a s eo fc h o o s i n gt h eg e n e r a ls t r a t e g y .3
In this paper we investigate how diﬀerent incentives facing bureau-
c r a t sa n dp o l i t i c i a n sl e a dt h e mt oa c td i ﬀerently in diﬀerent circum-
stances, and how the constitution should allocate tasks to the two types
of agents. Our starting point is the premise that politicians are mo-
tivated by a reelection goal, whereas bureaucrats are motivated by a
”career concern”. That is, politicians want to be re-elected; bureaucrats
instead want to improve their professional prospects in the public or pri-
vate sector, and this motivates them to perform well whatever tasks they
receive.4 In diﬀerent circumstances and for diﬀerent types of policies,
these incentives play out diﬀerently and this leads to a variety of trade
oﬀs in the choice of politicians or bureaucrats. We investigate both poli-
cies that have a ”public good” nature and redistributive policies. We
also discuss the role of bribes and campaign contributions in alternative
settings by stressing an agency problem: politicians and bureaucrats
1For an empirical discussion of the beneﬁts of independent central bankers see
Grilli Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), Alesina and Summers (1993) for OECD
countries and Cukierman (1992) for a larger sample of countries.
2Also the Business Council of Australia (1999) proposed that tax policy in Aus-
tralia be set by an independent agency within limits imposed by the legislature.
3See Putnam (1988) for a discussion of the role and beneﬁts of commitments in
international relations.
4For a discussion of how bureaucrats are motivated by prospect of career enhance-
ment see the classic treatment in Wilson (1989) especially Chapter 9.
2need to be motivated to put eﬀort or to abstain from grabbing rents for
themselves.
We analyze many diﬀerent types of policies, trying to be reasonably
exhaustive. Politicians tend to be preferable for tasks that have the fol-
lowing features: diﬀerences in performance are due to eﬀort, more than
to individual talent or technical ability; the preferences of the public are
unstable and uncertain, so that ﬂexibility is valuable, a case that may be
especially relevant for complex policy environments; time inconsistency
is unlikely to be a relevant issue; the stakes for organized interest groups
are small, or the legal system is poorly designed so that corruption is
widespread; side payments to compensate the losers are desirable and
relevant, or bundling of diﬀerent aspects of policy management and a
comprehensive approach is important; and ﬁnally in policies that are
purely redistributive. The reverse applies to the attribution of preroga-
tives to bureaucrats.
These results seem consistent with some features of existing insti-
tutional arrangements and may also serve as a normative benchmark
for the new Constitutions currently under formation such as the new
European Constitution and those of new democracies. A few examples
may clarify some of our points. Monetary policy involves fairly sophis-
ticated skills, has relatively few distributional consequences (compared
say to ﬁscal policy) and social preferences on what is the appropriate
goal of monetary policy do not vary much: at least ex-ante most people
would agree that monetary policy ought to control inﬂation with some
room for stabilization. Incidentally, these arguments provide a rationale
for independent central bankers even for those who do not believe that
time inconsistency of monetary policy is a major problem, such as Blin-
der (1999). On the contrary, foreign policy is an area where it is very
diﬃcult to describe ex ante reasonably precise and ﬁxed policy goals;
in a changing world the preferences of the public may change substan-
tially. Just think of how preferences for foreign policy changed in the
US before and after September 11, 2001. Finally, much of ﬁscal policy
has a redistributive nature and is in the hands of politicians. But other
redistributive policies that pit consumers at large against the special in-
terests of monopolistic producers, such as regulation utilities, are often
controlled by non elected bureaucrats.
Our paper is related to several recent contributions that have inves-
tigated the role of career concerns rather than explicit contracts. De-
watripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999a,b) discuss the foundations of this
approach and apply it to study the behavior of government agencies.
They focus on some issues related to ours, namely the nature and ”fuzzi-
ness” of the agencies mission, but they do not contrast bureaucratic and
3political accountability. Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) study the role
of advocates that provide information and opinion to policymakers, and
discuss how the career concerns of advocates may improve policymak-
ing. Probably the more closely related paper to ours is Maskin and
Tirole (2001). Their goal is to investigate the attribution of responsi-
bilities between accountable and non accountable agencies. The latter
have intrinsic motivations, while the former seek to please their prin-
cipals because of implicit rewards (career concerns). In our set up,
instead, we neglect the role of intrinsic motivations: both bureaucrats
and politicians need to be kept accountable with implicit incentives; but
the implicit incentive schemes can be of two kinds: those that deﬁne a
politician (striving for re-election), and those that deﬁne a bureaucrat
(career concerns). Besley and Gathak (2003) also study intrinsically
motivated agents, and focus on how to combine intrinsic motivation
with implicit rewards. Besley and Coate (2003) contrast appointed and
elected regulators of public utilities; both policymakers’ types are in-
trinsically motivated, but direct election allows the voters to unbundle
policy issues. Finally, we share with Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2002)
a discussion of the role of electoral control versus delegation of power,
although in a rather diﬀerent setting.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the simplest
case of our model and justiﬁes its assumptions. Sections 3 and 4 discuss
cases of policies with a ”public good” nature and with no redistribution.
Section 5 reviews the issue of delegation to solve time inconsistency
problems. Sections 6, 7 and 8 deal with redistribution and with the
role of organized interest groups. Section 9 discusses informally several
additional applications of our model and the last section concludes.
2 The Model
C o n s i d e ras o c i e t yt h a th a st od e c i d ew h e t h e rt oa s s i g nac e r t a i np o l i c y
to an elected oﬃcer or to a bureaucrat. With the generic term ”poli-
cymaker” we indicate who chooses policy, so he or she can be either a
politician or a bureaucrat.
I nt h es i m p l e s tp o s s i b l ec a s ew ec o n s i d e ras i n g l ep o l i c y ,t h er e s u l t
o fw h i c hi sd e t e r m i n e db yt h ee ﬀort put in by the policymaker and by
his ability. Thus, the policy outcome y is deﬁned as follows:
y = θ + a (1)
where a represents the eﬀort of the policymaker and θ ∼ N(¯ θ, σ2
θ)i sh i s
random ability. Ability and eﬀort are additive.5 Citizens care about the
5Alternatively they could be multiplicative leading to more complicated algebra
4policy outcome according to a well behaved, concave utility function,
U(y). For the moment we consider linear preferences, U(y)=y, since
the strict concavity of the utility function does not aﬀect the nature
of the results and simply makes the notation more cumbersome. We
introduce strict concavity later when it matters.
Eﬀort is costly, and the strictly convex and increasing cost is labelled
C(a). The reward for the policymaker is labelled R(a)a n di td i ﬀers
depending on whether the policymaker is a politician or a bureaucrat.
Both of them maximize their utility deﬁned as:
R(a) − C(a)( 2 )
with Ca > 0,C aa > 0a n dR(a)t ob ed e ﬁned below (subscripts denote
partial derivatives).
The timing is as follows. At the ”Constitutional Table” society
chooses who has control rights over the policy (in the simplest case there
is only one, there will be multiple policies later). Then the policymaker
chooses eﬀort, a, before knowing his ability, θ. Finally nature chooses θ,
outcomes are observed and the reward is paid. Irrespective of who has
control rights, only the outcome y is observable by the principals, not
its composition between eﬀort and ability. Hence the agent’s reward can
only be based on the policy outcome, y.
Note that we assume that control over a policy con only be given
either to a bureaucrat or to a politician: we do not allow for joint control
over policies, or for some checks and balances between the two. We
return to this issue below in the discussion of extensions.
2.1 The bureaucrat’s reward
We posit that bureaucrats are motivated by career concerns. That is,
they are concerned with the perception of their ability θ in the eyes of
those that may then promote them or oﬀer them alternative job oppor-
tunities in the private sector. Therefore the bureaucrat’s reward is (the
suﬃx B stands for Bureaucrat):
R
B(a)=E(E(θ | y)) = E(y − a
e)=E(θ + a − a
e)
where ae is the public’s perception of a. Note that, if the principal is risk
neutral, then the implicit reward oﬀered by career concerns coincides
with the optimal contract for the principal, under the constraint that
eﬀort and ability are not separately observable. In other words, if the
bureaucrat were the agent of a principal who provides monetary reward,
R(a) would be the equilibrium reward oﬀered.
but similar results. See Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999b) for a detailed dis-
cussion of diﬀerences in the two formulations.
52.2 The politician’ s reward
The politicians’s goal is to be reelected and he accomplishes this goal
if y is above a threshold W. T h e r e f o r ew eh a v e( t h es u ﬃx P stands for
Politician):
R
P(a)=P r ( y ≥ W)=1− P(W − a)( 3 )
where P(W −a)=P r ( θ ≤ W −a). We impose rationality of the voters,
so that they expect that the alternative to reelecting the incumbent is to
get another one with average talent, who in equilibrium will put the same
amount of eﬀort as the current one.6 In fact every period is identical
and the politician’s eﬀo r tc h o i c ei sm a d eb e f o r eh eo b s e r v e sh i st a l e n t .
It follows that:
W = ¯ θ + a
e (4)
We do not allow any career concerns for the politicians, other than
to be reelected. 7
3 Attribution of a single task
3.1 Perfect monitoring
We start with the simplest case, namely perfect monitoring of the policy
outcome y. We compute the ﬁrst order condition with respect to eﬀort,
a, taking the expected level of eﬀort ae as given, and then we impose the
equilibrium requirement, that ae = a. For the bureaucrat we obtain:
1=Ca(a
B)( 5 )
where aB indicates the equilibrium eﬀort of the bureaucrat.
With a normal distribution for θ, equilibrium eﬀort by the politician
aP, is deﬁned implicitly by:
n(¯ θ)=Ca(a
P)( 6 )
where n(¯ θ)=1 /σθ
√
2π is the density of the normal distribution of θ
evaluated at its mean.
It immediately follows that:
6Alternative assumptions about the determination of the threshold are of course
possible. We do not pursue here this extension.
7Persson and Tabellini (2000) discuss the implications of this political model more
extensively. An alternative would be to allow a non-elected politician to also have
career concerns, just as bureaucrats do. But as long as politicians retain an elec-
toral incentive, this more general formulation would cloud the algebra without many
additional insights.
6Proposition 1 aP ≶ aB depending on parameters’ values. But more
u n c e r t a i n t ya b o u ta b i l i t y( al a r g e rσθ) makes the bureaucrat more attrac-
tive.
Intuitively, an increase in the variance of θ makes politicians put less
eﬀort. The reason is that voters’ behavior is less sensitive to the obser-
vation of policy, since more of the policy outcome is due to randomness.
The marginal eﬀect of eﬀo r to nt h ep e r c e i v e db u r e a u c r a ta b i l i t yi si n -
stead independent of the variance of θ; this is because the compensation
oﬀered to a bureaucrat is linear in performance, and thus independent
of the distribution of ability.
One way of interpreting this result is that tasks for which talent is
especially important, that is tasks that are more inherently technical,
should be allocated to bureaucrats rather than politicians, a result that
seem reasonable and it is also obtained by Maskin and Tirole (2001) in
ad i ﬀerent context.8
3.2 Imperfect monitoring
We now move to the case of imperfect monitoring, that is a situation in
which performance is not perfectly observable. Thus, we add noise, ε,
besides talent (θ)a n de ﬀort (a):
y = θ + ε + a
with ε ∼ N(0,σ 2
ε), uncorrelated with θ and unobservable. Only perfor-
mance y is observed and can be the basis of rewards.
In this case the reward for bureaucrats can be rewritten as:
R
B(a)=E(E(θ | y)) = ¯ θ + βE(θ + ε + a − a
e − ¯ θ)( 7 )
where β = σ2
θ/(σ2
θ + σ2
ε) < 1. Given our assumption of normality of the
distributions, we obtain a well known signal extraction result. Now the
perception of talent is ”discounted” by a term β which reﬂects the signal
to noise ratio. In equilibrium the choice of the bureaucrat is given by:
β = Ca(a
B)( 8 )
Not surprisingly, the bureaucrat puts in less eﬀort the lower is the signal
to noise ratio.
The politician reward is now given by the same expression as above,
except that now the distribution from which the probability Pr(y ≥ W)
8This result would be reinforced if the extent to which bureaucratic ability is
rewarded were also allowed to vary. Tasks where technical abilities matter more are
also those for which rewards for ability are higher.
7can be computed has a larger variance, that reﬂects both the variance
of θ and of ε. It is immediate to derive the ﬁrst order condition of the
politician as follows:
n(¯ θ,0) = Ca(a
P)






2π) is the density of the random variable
θ + ε, evaluated at the mean of both θ and ε.
We are now ready to establish the following
Proposition 2 Imperfect monitoring (high σ2
ε) reduces eﬀort for both
types of policymakers. Higher σ2
θ increases aB but decreases aP.
Therefore, less monitoring does not favor one or the other type of
policymakers. However with imperfect monitoring a larger variance of θ
actually increases eﬀort of the bureaucrat; therefore this result strength-
ens what obtained in Proposition 1. This result is related to those ob-
tained by Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999b) who also point out
that performance less closely tied to talent or eﬀort weakens the incen-
tives of bureaucrats. But note that the same conclusions also apply to
a politician. Hence, imperfect monitoring reduces the performance of
any policymaker, but it does not provide an argument for preferring a
politician to a bureaucrat at the constitutional stage.
4C o m p l e x T a s k s
We now add an element of complexity in tasks. In particular we focus
on a situation (rather common) in which at the Constitutional Table the
voters are not sure how their preferences will evolve. We return to the
case of perfect monitoring and we assume that there are two possible
policies, that is two diﬀerent directions in which eﬀort can be devoted
to, that is yi = θ + ai, with i =1 ,2.
With multiple tasks, which will be our focus from now on, one
needs to specify a general cost function with multiple arguments, C =
C(a1,a 2). Instead of using the general formulation, we simplify to ei-
ther an additive case (C = C(a1 + a2)) or to a separable case, (C =
C(a1)+C(a2)) choosing the one that is simplest without generating
knife hedge or ”trivial” results. The more general speciﬁcation of costs
generates qualitatively similar results. We begin in this section by con-
sidering additive costs, so that C = C(a1 + a2).
At the Constitutional Table the (identical) voters are uncertain about
their ex post preferences over alternative policies, so that voters utility
is now given by the following strictly concave function:
U(λy1 +( 1− λ)y2)( 9 )
8with λ = 1 with probability q>1/2,λ= 0 with probability (1 − q).
Thus, society does not know ex ante what it will like ex post; but there
is no disagreement ex post amongst members of society. Disagreements
and redistribution will be analyzed below.
The timing is now as follows. First, at the Constitutional Table the
voters choose whether to assign this policy to a bureaucrat or to a politi-
cian, then nature chooses λ, that is social preferences are determined.
Then the policymaker chooses [ai], then nature chooses θ, and ﬁnally
policy is determined and rewards paid. We assume that λ is observable
but not veriﬁable.9
Choosing a non-elected bureaucrat means that voters decide at the
Constitutional Table to assign a task to the bureaucrat. Given that at
the Constitutional Table preferences are not yet known, one can only
assign to the bureaucrat an unconditional task deﬁned as follows:
y = δy1 +( 1− δ)y2 (10)
where δ is a parameter speciﬁed by the Constitution. A crucial assump-
tion is that the parameter δ cannot be contingent on the realization of
the random variable λ : the mission for the bureaucrat cannot be con-
tingent on the realization of ex post voters’ preferences. This element
of contract incompleteness is plausible: A bureaucrat is somebody who
is not appointed through the political process, and therefore he will not
follow the ebb and ﬂows of changing voters’ preferences. For example
the independence of the central bank is tied to the fact that the central
banker does not have to respond to the voters or even their represen-
tatives for his policy choices, other than for how he fulﬁlls the goals
assigned by the law to the central bank. But these goals can only be for-
mulated in a simple and general way, like keep inﬂation under control;
the central bank objectives cannot be changed with electoral results,
almost by deﬁnition of what an independent central bank is. 10
Under these assumptions, the rewards of the bureaucrats are:
R
B(a)=E(E(θ | y)) = E(θ + δa1 +( 1− δ)a2 − δa
e
1 − (1 − δ)a
e
2)( 1 1 )
Given additive costs and q>1/2, it is optimal to set δ =1 .11 The ﬁrst
9Aghion Alesina and Trebbi (2002) also study of constitutional design in a case
in which social preferences are not fully revealed ex ante. Their model and their
e m p h a s i si sh o w e v e rq u i t ed i ﬀerent.
10See Alesina and Gatti (1995) for an explicit discussion of insulation of the mis-
sions assigned to the central bank form changes in the preferences of the electorate.
11If costs were separable, then the optimal δ would be increasing with q, at a rate
that is decreasing with the curvature of U(.) for obvious reason having to do with
risk aversion;







2 =0 ( 1 2 )
That is the bureaucrat focuses all his eﬀort on the ”main” activity of his
mandate because that is more helpful in signaling his ability. Thus, the
voters’ utility in equilibrium is given by:
U
B = qEU(θ + a
B
1 )+( 1− q)EU(θ)( 1 3 )
The key here is that by choosing a bureaucrat who is non responsive to
the ebb and ﬂows of society’s preferences, citizens are ”stuck” with the
risk that eﬀort is misallocated and the bureaucrat pursues the wrong
goals, those that ex-ante seem more likely to be relevant.
This is what diﬀerentiates the politician from the bureaucrat. The
politician’s goals always depend on the realization of λ (i.e., on the pref-
erences of the voters). Thus, knowing λ the politician will devote eﬀort
only to the task preferred ex post by the voters according to the ﬁrst
order condition given above in (6). The following proposition follows.
Proposition 3 The politician always chooses the right task from the
voters’ perspective. This advantage of the politician is more im-
portant the more risk averse are the voters.
This result is simple but important. Delegation to bureaucrats is
safe when society’s preferences are well known and stable. But when
they change, the ”rigidity” of a bureaucrat’s behavior makes the latter
much less attractive. This helps us to understand why monetary policy
is often delegated to an independent central bank, while foreign policy is
typically under the control of politicians. Few would disagree with the
statement that the appropriate goal for monetary policy is to keep inﬂa-
tion under control with some room for stabilization policy; and this goal
is unlikely to change over time. But preferences regarding foreign policy
are unlikely to be stable and unchanged, and as a result an appropriate
simple bureaucratic goal cannot be stated once and for all. As a result,
having a politician make decisions under direct democratic control and
following the ebb and ﬂows of preferences in a changing world may be
superior to a ﬁxed and unchangeable bureaucratic mission.
Because in our formulation delegating policy to a bureaucrat implies
some rigidity, risk aversion plays a key role. More risk aversion implies
more aversion to rigidity, a result which is also obtained in a diﬀer-
ent setting about constitutional design by Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi
(2002).
105 Time inconsistency
The beneﬁts of ﬂexibility associated with political delegation has a cost,
when society’s preferences are time inconsistent. The rigidity of bu-
reaucratic control, instead, oﬀers protection against time inconsistency.
Delegation to an independent agency to gain credibility is extensively
used in monetary policy (as captured by Rogoﬀ (1985)). Our model
oﬀers a diﬀerent formalization of this point.
Suppose, again, that there are two tasks, i =1 ,2, say ﬁghting un-
employment (task 1) and enforcing tax collection (task 2). Citizens care
about both tasks, with simple linear preferences:
U(y1,y 2)=y1 + y2 (14)
Eﬀective tax enforcement depends on the policymaker’s eﬀort and abil-
ity, y2 = θ + a2. But equilibrium unemployment also depends on tax
enforcement relative to the private sector expectations, ae
2, because of
some externalities. Speciﬁcally, suppose that the policy outcome in task
1( ﬁghting unemployment) is given by:
y1 = θ + a1 − (a2 − a
e
2)( 1 5 )
Thus, low unemployment is brought about by ability and eﬀort in choos-
ing the right labor market policies (a1 + θ), but it is also facilitated by
an unexpectedly low level of tax enforcement. For instance, the allo-
cation of labor and capital between the underground and the formal
sector depends on the expectation of tax enforcement (ae
2). Tax enforce-
ment amounts to discover and ﬁne ﬁrms operating in the underground
economy. The expectation of tighter enforcement helps the economy,
because it induces ﬁrms to operate in the more eﬃcient formal sector
(this is where the externality would play a role). But once allocative de-
cisions have been made by private individuals, tight enforcement maybe
counterproductive (or less productive), because it subtracts resources
from the private sector and it may force some ﬁrms operating in the
underground economy to close down or ﬁre workers. Alternatively, as
in the standard Barro and Gordon (1983) model of monetary policy,
task 2 could be thought of as keeping low inﬂation, while task 1 could
be stimulating economic growth through tax on structural policies; ef-
fort in keeping inﬂation low (i.e. a high value of a2) reduces economic
growth, once private sector’s expectations of inﬂation have been freezed
into nominal wage contracts. Whatever the precise economic interpreta-
tion, in this model the ﬁnal outcome depends on the interaction between
the policymakers’ decisions and the private sector expectations, and this
creates a time inconsistency.
11Suppose throughout that policy commitments are unavailable, mean-
ing that ﬁrst private expectations are formed, and then eﬀort in both
tasks, a1 and a2, are chosen. One can show (see the Appendix for the
derivation) that politicians are much more likely to fall into the traps of
time inconsistency, compared to bureaucrats. The goals of a politician
are unavoidably linked to the ex-post welfare of voters, through reelec-
tion motives. The bureaucrat instead can be given an explicit mission,
possibly diﬀerent from whatever is ex-post optimal for the voters. This
possibility of strategic delegation enables society to overcome credibility
problems. When time inconsistency is a prominent determinant of pol-
icy decisions made under discretion, the case in favor of delegation to
a bureaucrat is very compelling. This conclusion is essentially identical
to Rogoﬀ’s point about strategic delegation in monetary policy. But
our framework shows more clearly another beneﬁt of bureaucratic del-
egation: it allows separation of tasks. One could assign one task to a
bureaucrat and one task to the politician. In the Appendix we show
more precisely the following:
Proposition 4 Under time inconsistency, the bureaucrat generally does
better than the politician, for two reasons: ﬁrst, the mission of a
bureaucrat can be narrowly deﬁn e dt oa v o i dt i m ei n c o n s i s t e n tg o a l s ;
second, even if this cannot be achieved because tasks cannot be split
among separate agencies, the mission of a bureaucrat can be deﬁned
strategically to inﬂuence private sector expectations, irrespective of
what is ex-post optimal for society.
A related issue has to do with the time dimension of the ﬂow of
costs and beneﬁts of diﬀerent policy tasks. Consider two types of poli-
cies: one gives immediate beneﬁts, the other delayed beneﬁts. Voters
have imperfect information on the nature of these beneﬁts and cannot
perfectly observe the policymakers’ eﬀort, as in the model of imperfect
monitoring discussed above. In this case the politician may have an
incentive to devote a suboptimally high level of eﬀort to the task that
gives immediate beneﬁts, which is visible before an election. By doing
so he manages to strategically inﬂate the signal of ability; this leads to a
suboptimal low level of eﬀort devoted to the policy with longer gestation
lag.12.
What about the bureaucrat in the same situation? To the extent
that their rewards have the same frequency of elections, they would
behave with the same incentive of politicians However, if their career
12Models by Rogoﬀ (1990), Rogoﬀ and Sibert (1988) and Persson and Tabellini
(1990 and 2000) are examples of this situation in the context of ﬁscal and monetary
policy respectively.
12rewards are more long term, they may have a lower incentive to tilt
their eﬀorts toward short termist policies, for two reasons. One is that
often bureaucrats are appointed for longer than electoral cycles, often
precisely to avoid short termist policies.13 The second one is that even if
the appointment of bureaucrats are short, if they distort policy choices
the blame may reach them later on and harm them later. This gives them
a stronger incentive to focus on the long term goal. A politician instead
may be overwhelmingly interested in winning the next elections and be
less worried about repercussions later on in his career, for two reasons.
One is that winning the next election is the only thing that really matters
for the politician, for instance because it is the last reelection opportunity
that he has. The second one is that even if his strategic manipulation
of eﬀort becomes known later on, it may not harm the politician that
much. In future election the main issues at hand may be diﬀerent and
the voters may forget past actions of the politician. On the contrary a
bureaucrats’ career may be much more sensitive to past mistakes.
The implication of all of the above is that there is an argument for
assigning to bureaucrats policy tasks that imply short term costs and/or
delayed beneﬁts.14
6 Lobbying and bribing
We now turn to policies which imply conﬂicts amongst diﬀerent mem-
bers of society, broadly speaking redistributive policies with winners and
losers. In this section we consider the case of lobbies that can inﬂuence
the choice of policies with bribes or campaign contributions . Thus here
”redistribution” is intended as favors toward powerful minorities. The
minority will seek to inﬂuence policy decisions to obtain favors. Both
the politician and the bureaucrat can be captured by the interest group,
but with diﬀerent mechanisms. This diﬀerence can give raise to a consti-
tutional preference for one or the other type of policymaker, depending
on the circumstances.
There are two tasks, i =1 ,2, both aﬀected linearly by eﬀort and
ability, with no spillover eﬀects across tasks: yi = θ + ai. The cost of
eﬀort is non-separable: C = C(a1 + a2). Task 1 beneﬁts the voters at
large, while task 2 only beneﬁts a small but organized interest group.
13Long terms of oﬃce for the Chairman of the Central Bank are considered a
necessary tool to insure independence and a long term horizon in the conduct of
monetary policy.
14Besley and Coate (2003) ﬁnd evidence that, in US states, elected regulators tend
to keep lower electricity prices compared to appointed regulators. If, as likely, lower
prices come at the expenses of lower investments, this ﬁnding is consistent with the
prediction of short-termism by elected (as opposed to appointed) regulators.
13Voters inﬂuence policy only through elections. The organized interest
group can inﬂuence policy either through bribes, b, or through campaign
contributions, f. Thus, the preferences of voters are just y1, while those
of the interest group can be written as:
(1 + γ)y2 − b − f (16)
where γ is a parameter capturing the intensity of the group’s preferences
for task 2.
Bribes can be oﬀered to both the politician and the bureaucrat, but
are illegal. Thus, if a policymaker accepts a bribe, with some exogenous
probability q he is caught and pays a ﬁne Z (the interest group is not
ﬁned). Campaign contributions are legal and can only be oﬀered to the
politician. The eﬀect of campaign contributions is to increase the incum-
bent’s chances of winning the elections. We model this by saying that
the voters’ reservation utility is a decreasing function of the campaign
contributions collected by the incumbent:
W = ¯ θ + a
e
1 − H(f)( 1 7 )
where the function H(.)c a p t u r e st h ee ﬀect of the campaign contributions
collected by the politician. It is natural to assume that H(0) = 0,H f >
0,H ff < 0. Under these assumptions, we can write the policymaker’s
preferences as:
R(y1,y 2) − C(a1 + a2)+( 1− φ)b − qZ (18)
where R(y1,y 2) are the policymaker’s rewards (RB(y1,y 2)=E(θ/y1)
for the bureaucrat, RP(y1,y 2)=P r ( y1 ≥ W) for the politician), and
1 >φ>0 denotes transaction costs that reduce the value of the bribe
for the recipient relative to the amount paid by the interest group. The
policymaker’s eﬀort devoted to task 2 is observable by the interest group,
so that bribes and campaign contributions can be contingent upon the
policymaker eﬀort: b = B(a2), f = F(a2). T h et i m i n go fe v e n t si sa sf o l -
lows. First the Constitution allocates control rights over policies. Then
the organized group commits to bribes and or campaign contributions,
as a function of eﬀort. Next, the policymaker allocates eﬀort between
the two tasks. Nature then chooses a realization of θ. Finally, rewards
are paid.
This is a common agency game, with two types of principals: the in-
terest group and the representative voter. The interest group has all the
commitment power and can either inﬂuence the agent directly (through
bribes), or indirectly (through campaign contributions). The distinc-
tion between the politician and the bureaucrat is that the latter can
14only be inﬂuenced by the interest group through bribes. We want to
know whether the voters are better oﬀ with the bureaucrat or with the
politician, and what inﬂuences this comparison.
6.1 Bribing the bureaucrat
If the constitution gave all control rights to the bureaucrat we would
have a standard common agency game, with a single active lobby. If
bribes are positive, then the equilibrium must be jointly optimal for the







a (1 + γ)( 1 9 )
Moreover, restricting attention to truthful contribution (here brib-
ing) schedules, the equilibrium bribing schedule has the following simple
form:15




where the constant ¯ B is chosen by the organized group so as to leave the
bureaucrat indiﬀerent between accepting or rejecting the bribe. Given
the bureaucrat’s preferences, this implies:
¯ B = C(a
B




1 − (1 + γ)a
B
2 +¯ qZ (21)
where aB
1 = C−1
a (1) denotes the equilibrium policy if no bribe is accepted.
Finally, the organized group must also prefer to pay the bribe rather
than be passive. This in turn puts an upper bound on the constant ¯ B
that the organized interest group is willing to pay. Taking into account
(21), an equilibrium with positive bribes exists only if the following con-
dition is satisﬁed:














≥ ¯ qZ (22)
If instead this condition is violated, then the equilibrium with the bu-
reaucrat delivers the optimal policy for the voters. Equation (22) makes
it clear that an equilibrium in which the bureaucrat is bribed is more
likely if the stakes for the organized group are high (γ is large), or if the
legal system works poorly (qZ and φ are small).
6.2 Lobbying the politician
Next, suppose that the politician is in charge of the policy decision. A
condition very similar to (22) above determines the existence of an equi-
librium with bribes (the expression is not identical because the politi-
cian’s reward occur through reappointment). In particular, it remains
15See Grossman and Helpman (2001).
15true that bribes would be zero if the legal system is strong, so that trans-
action costs are high or the probability of being caught is high. But now,
besides bribes, the organized interest group can also resort to campaign
contributions. He will choose to do so if campaign contributions are
suﬃciently eﬀective in swaying the voters.
Speciﬁcally, in an equilibrium with campaign contributions, the allo-
cation of eﬀort must be jointly optimal for the politician and the orga-
nized group. Thus, the equilibrium must solve the following optimization
problem by choice of a1,a2 and f, subject to non-negativity constraints





Pr(θ ≥ ¯ θ + a
e
1 − a1 − H(f)) + (1 + γ)a2 − C(a1 + a2) − f
ª
(23)
The properties of the solution to this problem depend on the slope
of the function H(f), i.e., on how eﬀective campaign contributions are
in swaying the voters. In the Appendix we consider two cases:
First, if Hf(0) < 1/(1 + γ), then the equilibrium has zero lobbying
(f = 0) and the outcome is optimal for the voters (aP
2 =0 ) . In this case,
campaign contributions cannot be productive enough, and the organized
group will not seek to inﬂuence the politician: the group’s stakes are
too low relative to how much he would have to pay into the electoral
campaign of the politician.
The opposite extreme occurs if Hf(f∗) > 1/(1 + γ), where f∗ de-
notes equilibrium campaign contributions, to be deﬁned below. In this
case, campaign contributions are very eﬀective at the margin. Eﬀort
is allocated so as to please only the organized group, as in (19) above.
And equilibrium campaign contributions are deﬁn e di m p l i c i t l yb yt h e
optimality condition:
n(¯ θ − H(f
∗)) · Hf(f
∗)=1 ( 2 4 )
where n(x) is the normal density of θ evaluated at the point x. For this
to be an equilibrium, the organized group must beneﬁtr e l a t i v et ot h e
option of not lobbying at all, and this also requires: (1 + γ)aP
2 ≥ f∗.
We summarize this discussion in the following:
Proposition 5 Political lobbying can be an equilibrium, even if bribes
to the bureaucrat are not. This is more likely if campaign contri-
butions are eﬀective in inﬂuencing the voters, but the legal system
is strong and eﬀective in discouraging bribes.
Thus, politically appointed policymakers are more easily captured by
organized interests compared to bureaucrats, particularly in advanced
16democracies with a well functioning legal system. The reason is that,
to inﬂuence a politician, the interest group needs to convince the voters
that the politician is doing a good job and deserves to be reelected. The
politician will then automatically respond with policy favors to the in-
terest group, since this will help his chances of reelection. To inﬂuence
a bureaucrat, instead, the organized group needs to engage in illegal or
semi-legal activities, and ﬁght against possibly deeply entrenched pro-
fessional goals and standards of a technical bureaucracy. Policies where
the stakes for organized interests are very high, or where redistributive
conﬂicts concern small but powerful vested interests against the voters
at large, may thus be more safely left in the hands of the bureaucrat.
This conclusion might explain why, in many advanced countries, the
regulation of public utilities is typically done by bureaucrats. In these
cases, the long run interests of consumers are easy to identify, and the
stakes for the utilities’ supplier are very high, so that a politician may
be more easily captured than the regulator.16
7C o m p e n s a t i o n o f l o s e r s
One critical task for politicians is to form coalitions in favor of certain
policies, compensating losers either with direct transfers or by bundling
several policies into one package. To illustrate this point, we need a con-
ﬂict of interest between voters (or groups of voters) and the possibility
of side payments and a possibility of bundling policies with complemen-
tarities.
Voters’ utility now depends on the policy outcome and the transfer
(positive or negative) received by the government. We have two voters
( or homogeneous groups of voters of equal size) with concave utility
function deﬁned over private consumption, U(ci),i=1 ,2a n dw h e r e :
c1 = y1 + t, c2 = y2 − t, y2 ≥ t ≥− y1 (25)
Therefore t is a direct lump sum transfer between voters and the gov-
ernment budget is balanced; there are no tax distortions. Each group
beneﬁts from diﬀerent tasks requiring speciﬁc and uncorrelated abilities,
θi,i=1 ,2. Let the distribution of θi h a v et h es a m ed e n s i t i e sn(.)a n dc u -
mulative distributions N(.) (not necessarily normal). There are random
negative spillovers between the two tasks, such that:
y1 = θ1 + a1 − λγa2,y 2 = θ2 + a2 − (1 − λ)γa1 (26)
The parameter 0 <γ<1 denotes the strength of the negative spillover
eﬀects. But who is hurt by the spillovers is ex ante uncertain. Thus, λ
16See however the evidence by Besley and Coate (2003) quoted above.
17is a random variable that can equal 1 or 0 with equal probabilities. As in
section 4, we assume that λ is observable but it is not veriﬁable, so that
the bureaucrat’s mission cannot be deﬁned contingent on λ.T h u s ,t h e
policymaker will maximize its usual payoﬀs, with additive cost functions
a n dw i t hd i ﬀerent rewards for the two types of policymakers:
R(a1,a 2) − C(a1) − C(a2)( 2 7 )
Timing has the usual structure. First nature sets λ and this deter-
mines which group is hurt by the spillover eﬀect. Then the policymaker
chooses ai and t, nature sets θi and rewards are paid.
Consider the politician ﬁrst. He maximizes reelection probabilities,
which means that he has to win the favor of a strict majority of voters.
Here this means winning the votes of both groups (as it will be clear be-
low, nothing of substance hinges on the fact that in this simple example
reelection requires pleasing all voters). Therefore:
R
P(a1,a 2)=P rob(U(c1) 1 W1) ∗ Prob(U(c2) 1 W2)( 2 8 )
where Wi is the reservation utility of group i.
Suppose for concreteness that λ =1 . If the two reservation utilities







where x1 = U−1(W)−t−a1+γa2 and x2 = U−1(W)+t−a2. That is, the
politician equalizes the ”hazard rates” of losing votes from either group.
In this context, the hazard rate measures the elasticity of the probability
of winning with respect to transfers. Thus, this optimality condition is
similar to the Ramsey rule of optimal taxation: transfers are allocated
b e t w e e ng r o u p ss oa st oe q u a l i z et h i s elasticity across groups. If the
hazard rate is monotonically increasing in x, and given the assumption
of the same distribution for θi,i=1 ,2, equation (29) implies c1 = c2.17
That is, the politician implements full insurance, fully compensating the
losers from the negative externality (remember that compensations are
costless, if they implied a transaction costs or a distortionary cost the
equalization of utilities would no be complete).
Exploiting (29), the optimality conditions for the allocation of eﬀort
to the two tasks imply:
n(1 − N2)=Ca(a
P
1 )( 3 0 )
n(1 − N1)(1 − γ)=Ca(a
P
2 )
17A uniform distribution of θ satisﬁes the assumption of a monotonically increasing
hazard rate, for instance.
18Thus, the politician will allocate eﬀort ”correctly”, in the sense of de-
voting more eﬀort to the task that does not have negative spillovers:
aP
1 >a P
2 if λ =1 . Comparing (30) with (6) in section 2, however, we
see that the politician is induced to put less eﬀort also in the task with
no negative externality (task 1), relative to the simple case of only one
task. The reason is that bundling of two tasks requiring diﬀerent abili-
ties weakens his incentives. His likelihood of reelection now depends on
his success in both tasks. Even if he puts a lot of eﬀort in task 1, he
could still loose the election because he happens to be unable in task
2. His awareness of this risk (captured by the term (1−N2)o nt h el e f t
hand side of (30)), dilutes his incentives.18
Let’s now turn to the bureaucrat. By assumption, the goal he is
assigned cannot be contingent on λ and has to be stated at the Consti-
tutional Table. The natural goal is to maximize total output, (y1 + y2).
If given this goal, the bureaucrat will allocate eﬀort eﬃciently, taking
the negative externality into account:
1=Ca(a
B
1 )( 3 1 )
1 − γ =Ca(a
B
2 )
Nevertheless, compensating transfers will be set to zero.
Comparing the politician and the bureaucrat, we thus have:
Proposition 6 The politician provides side payment to compensate losers
but has weaker incentives than the bureaucrat; the latter, however, does
not compensate losers.
This result relies on the fact that bureaucrats cannot be given state
contingent missions, and if their goal is formulated in terms of aggre-
gate eﬃciency, they will neglect the distributional consequences of their
actions. A politician instead can take advantage of relatively complex
and evolving spillovers between issues and build majorities with com-
plex side payments schemes. Compensating the losers makes it easier
to pass legislation while at the samet i m ep r o v i d i n gi n s u r a n c ea g a i n s t
bad luck. Imagine a policy that favors a large majority, say a badly
needed highway, but that creates losers, say the property owners. Under
democratic choice, the losers might be able to block the project. But the
politician can put together a package of compensation for the property
owners, with large beneﬁt for the majority. In a sense this is almost
what describes the job of a politician. Instead, it is hard to imagine how
18Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Seabright (1996) elaborate further on this point
comparing centralized vs decentralized arrangements.
19a bureaucrat might do that. How can one write on paper what a bureau-
crat is allowed to do or not do, to create bundling and compensation? A
bureaucrat can be delegated the task of building the best possible high-
way and he may potentially do a better job than the politician; but he
may not have the ability, interest or authority to provide compensation
to the local owners. Note also that ”writing some checks” to compensate
groups of losers does not require any particular technical competence,
another reason why it may be diﬃcult to generate the correct incentives
for bureaucrats motivated by the career concerns that we have modeled,
an observation which leads us directly into the next section.
8 Splitting the cake
We now consider a purely redistributive policy, ”cake splitting”. Con-
sider three voters, the minimum number required to make the problem
interesting. Each voter has a concave utility function deﬁned on ci with
i =1 ,2,3. The policy task delivers a ”cake” that can be divided between
the three voters, therefore:
y = θ + a = c1 + c2 + c3 (32)
The utility function of the voters is concave U(ci),i=1 ,2,3. The key
diﬀerence between a politician and a bureaucrat is, once again, that the
former needs a majority to win and the latter simply wants to signal
talent. The bureaucrat can either be given no redistributive tasks, in
which case redistribution is entirely arbitrary; alternatively, behind a veil
o fi g n o r a n c eh ec a nb ea s s i g n e dt h et ask of redistributing equally, that
is y/3 for all three voters. The politician needs two votes, and therefore
he will give y/2t ot w ov o t e r sa n dz e r ot ot h eo t h e ro n e .F o rt h es a k eo f
exposition consider ﬁrst the case of risk neutrality, i.e. U(ci)=ci.
Consider the politician ﬁrst. Since he only needs to please two voters
out of three, his reward is:
R
P(a)=P rob(y ≥ 2W)( 3 3 )
where W is the reservation utility of individual voters. With forward
looking and rational voters, W equals the average expected utility they
can get if the opponent is elected. If the hypothetical redistribution
implemented by the opponent is unknown ex-ante, then W =1 /3(θ +
ae). Going through the usual steps, of maximizing with respect to
eﬀort for given expectations and then imposing rational expectations, in
equilibrium the politician optimality condition implies:
n(2/3θ − a
P)=Ca(a
P)( 3 4 )
20where n(x) denotes the normal density evaluated at the point x. Com-
paring (34) with (6) in section 3, we see that once the politician is also in
charge of redistribution, he can get away with less eﬀort in equilibrium,
c o m p a r e dt ot h ec a s eo fn or e d i s t r i b u t i o n .T h er e a s o ni st h a t ,a sa l r e a d y
stated, here he only needs to please two voters out of three. He can thus
reduce eﬀort, and still please two voters with the portion of the cake
taken away from the minority.19
Next, consider the bureaucrat, and suppose that he is ”fair”, in the
s e n s et h a th eg i v e so n et h i r do fy to each voter. Then his ﬁrst order
conditions are still identical to those formulated in (??)(5), section 3.
This makes the bureaucrat more attractive for the voters for a larger
range of parameter values, compared to the case of no redistribution.
Intuitively, if indeed the mission of the bureaucrat can be formulated so
that he abstains from redistributing and treats all voters equally, then
the bureaucrat has a further advantage relative to the politician: he puts
in more eﬀort, because his incentives are not weakened by the possibility
of redistribution. This advantage of the bureaucrat is reinforced if voters
are risk averse, because then the politician would also expose the voters
to the risk of being in the minority, compared to a ”fair” bureaucrat.
There is however an interesting time inconsistency problem. Sup-
pose that a bureaucrat has been given the task. Ex post, when the
voters learn which majority would be put together by the politician, the
winning majority of the voters would generally want to take the task
away from the bureaucrat and to replace him with the politician.20 If
the redistributive stakes are strong enough, the constitution may not
have enough commitment power to resist these political pressures. In
this case, delegation to a bureaucrat may not be feasible in equilibrium,
even though it might be desirable ex-ante. This result underlies and
an additional distortionary eﬀect of redistributive policies, even without
tax distortions. Given an inability to commit to ex ante ”fair” policies,
in equilibrium a society may end up with a smaller cake.
Finally it is worth mentioning the case in which no redistributive
goals can be given to a bureaucrat and, therefore, he distributes the
cake in a totally arbitrary fashion. It is easy to see that in the case of
risk neutrality this does not aﬀect the choice ex ante between bureau-
19This result is similar to that obtained in Ferejohn (1986) and Persson and
Tabellini (2000). But since here voters are forward looking, we rule out the Bertarand
competition among voters that instead features in the backward looking voting equi-
librium of Ferejohn (1986).
20The precise conditions under which a majority of the voters would prefer to
replace the ”fair” bureaucrat with the politician depend on the details of the timing,
and in particular on whether the replacement occurs before or after eﬀort has been
chosen by the bureaucrat.
21crat and politician. But with risk aversion, uncertainty about how a
bureaucrat would allocate the cake increases the ex-ante desiderabilty
of the politician. Redistribution under the politician is less risky, since
two voters out of three are always included in the winning majority.
We can summarize the previous discussion into this
Proposition 7 The possibility of redistribution reduces the equilibrium
eﬀort of the politician, but not that of the bureaucrat. Risk aversion
makes the bureaucrat less or more desirable ex-ante depending on how
easy it is to impose fair treatment of all voters in his task description.
But even if the bureaucrat might be preferable ex ante, ex post a majority
of the voters would generally renege on this choice.
Summarizing, there are two reasons why politicians may be preferable
for splitting cakes, i.e. for purely redistributive policies. One is that a
time inconsistency problem may make the choice of a bureaucrat not
sustainable ex-post, even though ex ante optimal. The second reason is
that one can judge talent from the size of the cake, but it is more diﬃcult
to judge talent from how one cuts the cake. The constitution chosen
behind a veil of ignorance could give the bureaucrat precise directions
about how the cake should be cut. In practice, however, it may be quite
diﬃcult to describe ex ante a precise redistributive scheme. Leaving aside
t h et i m ei n c o n s i s t e n c yp r o b l e m ,r i sk averse voters may be unwilling to
delegate redistribution to a bureaucrat interested only to maximize the
cake and with unclear incentives about how to cut it.
9 Extensions
Our framework can be extended in several directions. One involves
modelling a more direct interaction between politicians and bureaucrats.
Thus far we have considered the extreme cases in which a policy is fully
in the hand of an elected politician or of a bureaucrat. In reality one
can think of policies in which the tasks are split between the two. We
should distinguish between two cases. One, less interesting, occurs when
a politician has full decision making authority and simply delegates to
a bureaucrat purely technical tasks with no decision power. We view
this as a relatively minor extension of the case of our model in which
the politician has full control of policy. A more interesting case is one
in which the actual decision about a certain task is divided between the
two and the bureaucrat has some independent decision power over some
aspects of the policy.
An important example has to do with our discussion of redistribu-
tion. We could think of policies that simply increase the size of the cake
22and that have a more technical nature; these could be more easily del-
egated to a bureaucrat, while the politician could be left in charge of
redistribution. In other words political bodies should decide the general
criteria of taxation, expenditures, ﬁscal policy and desired allocations
of costs and beneﬁts, while independent technical agencies should have
the task of ﬁnding the less wasteful way of achieving these general goals.
For example the legislatures could decide the desired redistributive cri-
teria for the personal income tax and an independent bureaucrat would
design the actual structure of rates, exemptions etc. This system has
the advantage that the legislature would loose much of its the ability
of using relatively technical and ”obscure” parts of the policy formation
process to grant favors to speciﬁc lobbies and pressure groups. This ad-
vantage, that in principle seems considerable, should be weighed against
the possibility of bribes for bureaucrats, an issue discussed above.21
Note however that the interaction between bureaucrats and politi-
cians may also serve another function. Often bureaucrats are used by
politicians as scapegoats. For instance ”excessive” monetary tightening
is often invoked by politicians to justify poor economic conditions even
when monetary policy has nothing to do with it. According to Alesina
et al. (2001) for instance, this is precisely what has been happening in
Europe since the creation of the European Central Bank, a very inde-
pendent body, with an inﬂation target. In Italy often the bureaucrat in
charge of public accounting is used by potentially overspending politi-
cians to argue that their hands are tied. A similar role may be served
by an international bureaucracy, such as the IMF, when it prescribes
so called ”unpopular” policies to macroeconomically unstable countries
(see the discussion in Vreeland (2003)).
The role of bureaucrats as scapegoats may certainly serve the op-
portunistic role of politicians, who taking advantage of the imperfect
information of the public may indeed succeed, at least partially, in shift-
ing the blame. This may interfere with the public’s ability to appoint
able and honest politicians. Note however that having scapegoats may
actually be welfare enhancing because it may allow elected politicians to
shift the blame for ”unpopular” policies, for instance those with short
run costs and long run beneﬁts. Since the politicians can shift the blame
in equilibrium one may have a higher dose of unpopular but welfare en-
hancing (in the long run) policies, precisely because the electoral cost of
t h e s ep o l i c e sa r er e d u c e db yb l a m es h i f t i n g .
A third extension relates to the endogenous choice of procedures, es-
pecially with regard to their trasnparency. Politicians may not always
prefer the most transparent way of presenting their acts, an issue ex-
21See also Blinder (1997).
23plored also in Alesina and Cukierman (1991) in a diﬀerent context.22
One of the most often cited example has to do with budgetary pro-
cedures. Often public budgets are exceedingly complicated, and these
complicated budget documents are approved in very cumbersome ways.23
This complication is often higher than necessary, perhaps to make it
harder for the public at large to discover all the various favors made to
pressure groups in the darker corners of the budget. If the degree of
transparency (say the variance of ε in our case of imperfect monitoring
above) can be chosen by the policymaker, both the politician and the
bureaucrat may prefer opaque procedures. An optimal arrangement here
might be to split responsibilities, so that the policymaker choosing the
procedure is not the same one in charge of making decisions under that
procedure (i.e., he is not the residual claimant of the rents induced by a
less transparent procedure).24
Finally, we have characterized what would happen if the constitu-
tion was written optimally, that is behind a veil of ignorance. But this
is not normally the case. For instance, to the extent that existing politi-
cians may have an important role at the table in which Constitutions
are written, one may ﬁnd that actual Constitutions may deviate signiﬁ-
cantly from the optimality criteria that we have sketched. For instance
real world politicians may push towards keeping for politicians precisely
those functions that make their life easier (or richer); for instance politi-
cians may be keen on retaining exactly those functions that are likely
to generate generous campaign contributions even though, precisely for
these reasons, these functions should be delegated to bureaucrats. Thus
while we have emphasized a ”normative” analysis of the Constitutional
Table one could use our framework to discuss what politicians would
choose to allocate to themselves and what not. This would certainly
lead to diﬀerent constitutional trade-oﬀs compared to those discussed in
the previous pages.
10 Conclusions
Our analysis rests on two fundamental assumptions. The ﬁrst one con-
cerns the motivation of diﬀerent types of policymakers, bureaucrats and
elected politicians. The former wants to signal their competence for ca-
reer concerns, the latter for reelection purposes. The second assumption
22These authors show that an ”ideological” polticians may prefer to have his poli-
cies less observable to appear more moderate in a run up to the election.
23See the volume edited by Poterba and von Hagen (2000) for an extensive discus-
sion of the role of transparency in the budget process.
24Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1987) study the beneﬁts of separation of powers
in a related context.
24is that the tasks for bureaucratic agencies have to be speciﬁed ex ante
and cannot be contingent on the realization of too many shocks on the
environment and/or on the public’s preferences. If one accepts these
two hypotheses, the nature of our results is quite robust to variations on
other less important assumptions.
This diﬀerence in how incentives play out can then be used at the
constitutional table to design the appropriate allocation of tasks between
the two types of policymakers. We have considered three general classes
of policies: those concerning a single task, those concerning several inter-
related tasks, and those concerning redistributive tasks. Consider ﬁrst
the case of a single policy dimension. Tasks requiring special skills and
abilities (i.e. skills not shared by the population at large and with high
uncertainty about the policymaker’s ability) are better left in the hands
of a bureaucrat. The reason is not so much that the bureaucrat may be
more likely to have these skills, but rather that he has stronger incen-
tives to show that he indeed has them. On the other hand, imperfect
monitoring weakens the incentives of both policymaker types, and it is
not necessarily an argument against bureaucratic delegation.
Next, consider policies with multiple dimensions, i.e. where the pol-
icy in question has several eﬀects that have to be traded oﬀ against each
other, and where there many options to choose from. Here, the politician
generally is preferable for two reasons. First, it may be diﬃcult to spell
out ex-ante a well deﬁned policy goal and while this ex-ante deﬁnition
is necessary only for the bureaucrat, on the contrary the politician is
automatically inclined to do whatever is in the interest of the voters.
Second, the incentives of the politician induce him to take into account
policy complementarities (he has to look at the overall welfare eﬀect on
voters), and to compensate the losers. A bureaucrat instead has a nar-
rower vision due to the speciﬁcity of the task assigned to him. These
advantages of the politician become a handicap in the case of time incon-
sistent policies, however. Here, a narrowly deﬁned bureaucratic mission
enhances policy credibility and becomes a reason to prefer a bureaucrat.
Finally, consider redistributive policies. Here the nature of the con-
ﬂict matters. If the policy creates a conﬂict between voters at large
against powerful but small special interests, then political delegation is
more risky, because the politician is more likely to be captured by the
interest group compared to the bureaucrat. The reason is that the in-
terest group has one more weapon to use, with the politician, namely
to help him be reelected; this weapon is useless instead in the case of
the bureaucrat. The conclusion is reversed, however, in the case of re-
distributive conﬂicts between large groups in the population. Here it is
generally impossible to clearly deﬁne the bureaucratic mission in terms
25of the interest of the voters’ at large; hence, there is always the risk that
the bureaucrat will arbitrarily favor one group over the other. Moreover,
even if this risk could be avoided, the constitution may not have enough
commitment power to prevent removing the bureaucrat from oﬃce to
replace him with a politician that would beneﬁt the majority of voters.
Hence, even if desirable, bureaucratic delegation may be unfeasible.
Appendix
1. Time inconsistency
There are two tasks, i =1 ,2, and:
U(y1,y 2)=y1 + y2 (35)
For task two y2 = θ +a2. But y1 depends also on private sector expec-
tations, ae
2.
y1 = θ + a1 − (a2 − a
e
2)( 3 6 )
Suppose throughout that policy commitments are unavailable, mean-
ing that ﬁrst private expectations are formed, and then eﬀort in both
tasks, a1 and a2, are chosen. In order to stress the diﬀerence between
the bureaucrat and the politician, suppose now that costs are additive:
c = C(a1)+C(a2). The politician allocates eﬀo r ts oa st om a x i m i z e :
Pr(y1 + y2 ≥ W) − C(a1) − C(a2)( 3 7 )
taking the voters’ reservation utility,W, and the private sector expec-
tations, ae
2, as given. In equilibrium, W =2 ¯ θ + ae
1 + ae
2 .T a k i n g t h e
ﬁrst order optimality conditions for the politician and imposing rational









Equilibrium eﬀort on task 1 is determined by the same condition as in
section 3, except that the left hand side is divided by 2 because now
task 1 only contributes 50% to improve the politician’s chances for re-
election. But the politician exerts no eﬀo r ta ta l lo nt a s k2b e c a u s e
ex-post the beneﬁt for the voters from this policy outcome are exactly
oﬀset by the negative eﬀect on the performance of task 1. Since voters
assign equal weights to both tasks, and eﬀort is costly, the politician
26ex-post prefers to do nothing. Of course, this is suboptimal from an
ex-ante perspective: only unexpectedly high a2 hurts the performance of
task 1, and under rational expectations the voters would be better oﬀ
if the politician could commit to exert high eﬀort also in task 2, and
expectations were formed accordingly. Overall voters’ utility under the
politician is thus:
U
P =2 ¯ θ + a
P
1 (39)
Next, consider the bureaucrat, and suppose that his ability is evalu-
ated according to a composite measure of performance, y = δy1 +( 1−
δ)y2, as in (11) above. Repeating the same steps, and still taking expec-
t a t i o n sa sg i v e n ,w en o wo b t a i n :
δ =Ca(a
B
1 )( 4 0 )
(1 − 2δ)≤Ca(a
B
2 )( 4 1 )
Like the politician, and for the same reasons, the bureaucrat too exerts
less eﬀort in task 2 than in task 1, because under discretion he perceives
a cost from unexpectedly high eﬀort. In fact, for δ ≥ 1/2, (41) implies
aB
2 =0 . But now, the constitution gives a tool to overcome this incentive
problem: tilting the bureaucratic mission towards task 2, with δ<1/2,
induces the bureaucrat to reduce aB
1 and increase aB
2 . Since costs are
convex, at least over some range aB
2 increases by more than aB
1 is reduced.
Moreover, if expectations are formed after the constitutional stage, this is
reﬂected into expectations, and aB
2 = ae
2, so that the loss in performance
in task 1 is more than oﬀset by the improved performance in task 2.
Hence, the voters’ expected utility is:
U





Unless eﬀort by the politician in task 1 is very high, the voters are likely
to be better oﬀ under the bureaucrat. In fact, voters would be even
better oﬀ i ft a s k s1a n d2c o u l db es p l i tb e t w e e nt w od i s t i n c tb u r e a u c r a t s
(or between a politician in charge of task 1 and a bureaucrat in charge
of task 2). The bureaucrat in charge of task 2 could be given a mission
deﬁned only on y2 as a basis of performance, and someone else could be
in charge of task 1. This would get rid entirely of the time inconsistency,
since the bureaucrat in charge of task 2 would now disregard completely
t h en e g a t i v ei m p a c to fu n e x p e c t e d l yh i g ha2 in the performance of the
other task. The proposition in the text follows.
2. Lobbying
As stated in the text, the equilibrium with lobbying must solve the
following optimization problem by choice of a1,a2 and f, subject to non-
negativity constraints on the three choice variables, and taking voters’
27expectations ae
1 as given, as before.
Max
©
Pr(θ ≥ ¯ θ + a
e
1 − a1 − H(f)) + (1 + γ)a2 − C(a1 + a2) − f
ª
(43)
The ﬁrst order conditions for a1,a 2 and f evaluated at the point
ae
1 = a1 imply respectively:
n(¯ θ − H(f)) − Ca(a1 + a2)+µ1 =0 (44)
1+γ − Ca(a1 + a2)+µ2 =0 (45)
n(¯ θ − H(f))Hf(f) − 1+µ3 =0 (46)
where µi,i=1 ,2 are the lagrange multipliers on the non-negativity con-
straints for ai, while µ3 is the lagrange multiplier on the non-negativity
constraint for f.
Consider ﬁrst the case Hf(0) < 1/(1 + γ). Since Hff < 0, here
lobbying is ineﬃcient, and the ﬁrst order conditions can only be satisﬁed
if f = a2 =0a n da1 is at an interior optimum deﬁned by (44) with µ1 =0
in it.
Next, consider the case Hf(f∗) > 1/(1 + γ). This is the opposite
extreme, in which lobbying is very eﬀective. In this case a1 =0a n d
a2 and f∗ a r ea ta ni n t e r i o ro p t i m u md e ﬁned by (45) and (46) with
µ2 = µ3 =0i nt h e m .
In the intermediate case, in which Hf(0) > 1/(1+γ) but the returns
to campaign contributions fall rapidly, an equilibrium with lobbying does
n o ta l w a y se x i s .As p e c i a lk n i f ee d g ec a s ei sg i v e nb yt h ec a s ei nw h i c h
Hf(0) > 1/(1 + γ)a n dHf(f∗)=1 /(1 + γ)=n(¯ θ − Hf(f∗)). Here a1
and a2 can both be positive, and are deﬁned by
1+γ = Ca(a1 + a2)
and by the condition that the politician is indiﬀerent between this equi-
librium and the one with no lobbying.
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